Accounting for human rights : doxic health and safety practices - the accounting lessons from ICL by Cooper, C. et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Cooper, C. and Coulson, A.B. and Taylor, P. (2011) Accounting for human rights : doxic health and
safety practices - the accounting lessons from ICL. Critical Perspectives On Accounting, 22 (8).
738–758. ISSN 1045-2354
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting for Human Rights: Doxic Health and Safety Practices – the accounting 
lesson from ICL 
 
 
 
Christine Cooper 
Andrea Coulson 
Phil Taylor 
 
 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting for Human Rights: Doxic Health and Safety Practices – the accounting 
lesson from ICL 
 
 
 
Christine Cooper 
Andrea Coulson 
Phil Taylor 
 2 
Accounting for Human Rights: Doxic Health and Safety Practices – the accounting 
lesson from ICL 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with a specific human right – the right to work in a safe 
environment.  It sets out a case for developing a new form of account of health and 
safety in any organisational setting. It draws upon the theoretical insights of Pierre 
Bourdieu taking inspiration from his assertion that in order to understand the “logic” 
of the worlds we live in we need to immerse ourselves into the particularity of an 
empirical reality.   In this case the paper, analyses a preventable industrial disaster 
which occurred in Glasgow, Scotland which killed nine people1 and injured 33 others.    
The paper unearths the underlying structures of symbolic violence of the UK State, 
the Health and Safety Executive and capital with respect to health and safety at work 
in the case.  While dealing with one specific country (Scotland) and arguably an 
anomalous event we contend that Bourdieu’s objective of constructing a special case 
of what is possible can equally be used to question health and safety regimes and 
other forms of symbolic violence across the globe. 
 
                                                 
1
 Among the dead were Tracey McErlane, 27, a receptionist from Possilpark, Glasgow, who left behind 
a seven-month-old son, Ryan; Ann Trench, 34, a computer operator from Colston, who was to due to 
end 15 years of service with ICL with her last shift; Margaret Brownlie, 49, from Strathaven; Peter 
Ferguson, 52, from Renfrewshire; Annette Rosina Doyle 24, of Crowhill St., Glasgow; Thomas 
McAulay, 41, from Glasgow; Kenneth Murray, 45; Timothy Smith, 31; and the chief executive of the 
company, Stewart McColl, 60, whose daughter, Sheena, had her leg amputated after she was crushed 
by falling masonry.  
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Bourdieu (1998, p 2) “My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based upon the 
belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one 
plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and 
dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a “special case of what is 
possible,” as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite world 
of possible configurations. 
 
 
 
This paper deals with a very specific human right – the right to work in a safe 
environment.  The scale of the abuse of this human right is profound.  While it is 
impossible to know exactly how many people are killed and injured each year at 
work, the International Labour Organization reports that 2.2 million workers were 
killed in 2005 by occupational accidents and work-related diseases, another 270 
million suffered non-fatal accidents, and 160 million were hit with occupational 
diseases.2  These deaths and injuries are not confined to the economic south.  For 
example, in Canada, official statistics suggest that there are in the region of one 
million workplace injuries a year although many work-related deaths do not appear 
in the official statistics, because they were not accepted as such by Workers 
Compensation Boards, or resulted from occupational diseases not yet recognized as 
having roots in the workplace. 
 
In this paper we will set out a case that if we are to take the notion of accounting for 
human rights seriously we will need a radically different form of accounting.  While it 
is possible for the abuse of workers’ human rights to take many forms, in this paper, 
without demeaning all forms of abuse, we concentrate solely on the right to a safe 
working environment. This concern forms part of the Charter for Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union Article 31 “Fair and Just Working Conditions - 1. Every worker 
has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and 
dignity” (European Community, 2000; 15).  
 
The paper develops its proposed way of accounting for human rights through an in 
depth analysis of an industrial disaster which occurred on 11 May 2004 at the ICL 
Plastics plant in Grovepark Mills in Maryhill, Glasgow which killed nine people and 
injured 33 others. This was the worst health and safety incident in Scotland since 
Piper Alpha in 1988 when 167 lives were lost, and the worst on mainland Scotland 
since the 1960s.  ICL produced plastic goods for everything from the meat trade to 
hospitals. In addition, it specialised in producing protective equipment for the police, 
such as riot shields and leg guards.  The factory operations involved dangerous gases 
and chemicals.  On 11th May 2004, 66 people worked on the premises.   The 
explosion was caused by a corroded pipe which carried liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG)3 from a tank in the yard into the factory building.  The pipe went into the 
basement of the factory.  The pipe leaked LPG into the basement, creating an 
explosive atmosphere.  The explosion occurred somehow (probably when an electric 
                                                 
2
http://www.peoplesvoice.ca/articleprint16/01)_DEATH_IN_THE_WORKPLACE__A_GLOBAL_EPIDEMI
C.html 
3
 Also called GPL, LP Gas, or autogas 
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light was switched on) when a worker, Kenneth Murray, went into the basement to 
collect materials stored there.  Kenneth Murray died in the basement of injuries 
consistent with his having been at the point of the explosion. Blood samples showed 
that he had inhaled propane gas before the explosion.  
 
On 17th August, 2007, ICL Tech Limited and its parent ICL Plastics Limited pled guilty 
to statutory breaches of Health & Safety Work Act of 1974 (see Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal, 2007).   A review of the information available from Company’s 
House records (3 types of filings: un-audited abbreviated accounts, current 
appointments reports, and 363S annual returns) reveals that ICL Plastics had 
£897,511 in cash holdings at the end of November, 2003, (for further detail see Beck 
et al, 2007).  Both companies were subsequently fined £200,000 (Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service, 2007). 
 
The disaster marked the first joint UK Public Inquiry between the Scottish 
Government4 and UK representatives in Westminster.   The empirical insights in the 
paper are drawn from the documentation of the Public Inquiry, and the financial 
returns of the company lodged at Companies House.  The Research Team also took 
copious notes throughout the ICL trial and used ‘action research’ methods, based on 
the participation of a group of seven ICL workers and ex-workers representative of 
different sections/functions in the plant. Both ‘risk mapping’ and ‘body mapping’ 
exercises were used whereby workers provided unrivalled evidence of working 
conditions, potential hazards and symptoms of ill-health. In-depth worker interviews 
provided further invaluable data.  
 
Historically the hidden cost of capitalist development has been human lives – the 
industrial revolution in Victorian Britain saw the death rate increase dramatically. As 
Marx (1976) highlighted, aspects of the working environment that we would now 
deem unacceptable such as child labour were core to industrialisation. We see this 
mirrored today as both a cost in the developing world and a cost of greed among the 
more developed (Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2008; Smith et al., 2006; 
Watterson, 2000; Tombs, 1999; Pearce & Tombs, 1998). However, in the so-called 
developed world we argue that there is an expectation that our employer and the 
infrastructure ‘regulating’ our society will act in our interest and protect us: we have 
legal systems and regulatory frameworks of elected agencies to “protect” us.   Thus 
workers’s subjectivities are constituted as “protected western employees”; these 
mental structures are reinforced by the objective structures of the State – the Health 
and Safety Executive, juridical procedures and so on.  
 
The theoretical perspective in the paper draws from the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  
Bourdieu’s theoretical work sets forth a dialectical relationship between agency and 
structure which transcends the apparently irreconcilable perspectives of objectivism 
                                                 
4 Since 1999, Scotland has had a devolved government. The Scottish Government is responsible for 
most of the issues of day-to-day concern to the people of Scotland, including health, education, 
justice, rural affairs, and transport. However, the Scottish Government does not have fiscal autonomy 
from Westminster (the UK government). Fiscal restraint restricts the ability of the Scottish Parliament 
to address the very serious problems in health, education, housing, poverty and jobs. 
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and subjectivism (Mahar et al 1990) and thus is key to enabling an understanding of 
health and safety practice in the UK which workers, employers and health and safety 
inspectors each with their various subjectivities (and habitus) act within particular 
institutional settings.  Bourdieu was concerned with both the social genesis of 
mental structures5 and the objective structures which unconsciously act to orient 
and constrain social practice.   The conformity between mental and objective 
structures is called doxa in Bourdieu’s account (Mahar et al, 1990).   
 
However, the relationship between mental and objective structures is not totally 
arbitrary, Bourdieu’s work takes a class/power perspective in which the point of view 
of the dominant is imposed as the universal point of view.  Our mental structures are 
strictly controlled by preconceived thematics which to a large extent are imposed by 
a broadly defined state.  The thematics portray a particular non-neutral vision of 
reality which serves to uphold the interests of the most powerful.  Meaning 
(reinforced by objective structures) is imposed upon individuals, groups and classes 
in a manner which both obscures power relations and legitimates them.  Bourdieu 
described this process as misrecognition, a process, “whereby power relations are 
perceived not for what they objectively are but in the form which renders them 
legitimate in the eyes of the beholder” (Bourdieu, 1977b, p xiii). The imposition of 
systems of symbolism and meaning which hide objective power relations in a form 
which renders them legitimate is described by Bourdieu as symbolic violence.  This 
paper unearths the underlying objective structures of “symbolic violence” which 
frame the subjective health and safety expectations of workers in ICL (and in the UK 
generally).  Symbolic violence is in some senses more powerful than physical 
violence, in that it is embedded in the very modes of action and structures of 
cognition of individuals and imposes the vision of the legitimacy of the social order.  
We argue that UK State symbolism and its representative vehicle the Health and 
Safety Executive is violent in the sense that their power over categorisation is as, if 
not more, constraining on workers than physical violence and is used to maintain 
social domination.   
 
The theoretical insights of Pierre Bourdieu used within the paper take inspiration 
from his assertion that in order to understand the “logic” of the worlds we live in we 
need to immerse ourselves into the particularity of an empirical reality.   Indeed 
Bourdieu’s concepts are flexible and must be examined by the researcher in an 
empirical setting rather than being seen as a set of categorical boxes to which the 
data must conform (Mahar et al 1990).  In this case we analyse the ICL disaster with 
the objective of constructing, in Bourdieu’s words “a special case of what is possible” 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p 2).  
 
While we deal with one specific country (Scotland), and arguably an anomalous 
event, we contend that Bourdieu’s explanation of symbolic violence can be used to 
analyse health and safety regimes across the globe.  In this sense the ICL disaster is 
not anomalous.  Rather, as will be seen from the case study, it is possible by 
analyzing the disaster, to draw out the deepest logic of the symbols and structures of 
                                                 
5
 Although  Bourdieu’s structures are different from those found in Levi-Strauss. 
 6 
the economic and political systems that influence our sense of safety when we go to 
work; an understanding of which add insights into the millions of industrial deaths 
and injuries which occur throughout the globe every year.  
 
The paper is structured as follows; the next section reviews research on accounting 
for workers and their human rights before turning to highlight the (mis)use of 
accounting information in the legal prosecution of ICL for breaches of health and 
safety legislation. Looking through the lens of social domination and symbolic 
violence offered by Bourdieu we seek to make visible ICL’s formal accounts and the 
role which they play in the symbolic violence inherent in this case. In order to fully 
appreciate the extent of abuse of the workers’ rights to health and safety it is 
necessary to consider the role of the State and its agents, namely the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE), as complicit in the social system of domination in which ICL is 
only one part. The paper ends with reflections on the accounting lesson from ICL.  
We argue that by viewing the human right to work in a safe environment through 
the lens provided by Bourdieu we can craft a radical form of accounting for human 
rights. 
 
 
Extant accounting for workers and their human rights 
 
Accounting research on corporate social accounting and accountability has 
considered the human rights of employees in many guises. A simple distinction can 
be drawn between the ‘rights’ of workers to receive information (reporting to 
employees) and a more inclusive approach on the ‘rights’ of others to receive 
information about workers (reporting on employees/ employee-related accounting 
and reporting).  More traditional approaches to both reporting to and reporting on 
employees use financial and management reporting frameworks in a hierarchical, 
functional form to hold owners and managers within the corporation socially 
accountable to stakeholders (see for example O’Dwyer & Unerman; 2007; Spence & 
Gray, 2007;  Everett; 2003).  
 
The historical perspective on accounting for human rights at work varies.  Gray et 
al.’s (1996) comprehensive review of reporting to and on employees in its many 
guises recognises the practice of what they refer to as employee-related reporting 
(about employees) was rooted in the 1940s.  In the 1970s, perhaps reflecting the 
mind-set of the period, the Accounting Standards Steering Committee’s production 
of the “Corporate Report” (ASSC, 1975) added political legitimacy to the 
identification of employees as ‘special’ stakeholders with a right to financial 
information in the form of specific purpose employee reports including a Value 
Added Statement which tried to set out the amount of profit distributed to 
shareholders, employees and government.  Since then, divergent views have been 
expressed on the extent to which reporting to workers raises their awareness of 
important work issues and provides a useful educative role versus the extent to 
which reporting is used as a tool to discipline workers.  
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The role of accounting in the struggle on the economic field between capital and 
labour over the allocation of surplus value has also been considered.  Taking into 
account the potential collective bargaining power of employees a number of 
research studies have considered the potential for employee-related reporting to 
contribute to trade unions and management decision making in times of disputes 
over what constitutes fair pay (Cooper & Essex, 1977; Foley & Maunders, 1977; 
Cooper, 1984; Jackson-Cox et al., 1984; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; McBarnet et al., 
1994). One approach, perhaps best exemplified in Pope and Peel (1981) suggests 
that since accounting information is “neutral”, it could play a positive role in 
thrashing out fair pay settlements.  This approach perpetuates the state (and 
economic capital) sanctioned categorisation of accounting reports as neutral and 
useful for decision making purposes.  Sikka (2008) perceptively recognises that the 
growing symbolic interactions (in the form of academic literature, reports, 
government debates, and so on) surrounding “corporate governance” participate in 
the perpetuation of symbolic violence in the sense that they set up the debate as if 
corporate governance is concerned with fairness.  Thus corporate governance serves 
to legitimate the status quo.  Whereas academic work on corporate governance 
ignores workers and leaves no space for rendering income and wealth inequalities 
visible.  Other research has demonstrated how accounting information can be 
manipulated to favour the position of management.  For example Berry et al’s (1985) 
study of the National Coal Board accounts found that management accounts did not 
form an adequate basis for decisions about pit closures.  This research showed that it 
was likely that pits were being closed for political rather than economic reasons.  
Overall, critical research suggests that in a capitalist system of domination, capital 
will continue to neglect labour in favour of profit (Dey et al., 1994; Cooper, 1995; 
Dey, 2007; Owen, 2007) and that accounting can be used to promote the interests of 
the most powerful.  
 
The difficulties involved in putting “human assets” into financial statements has long 
been discussed by academics.  This type of accounting has recently coalesced around 
the question of accounting for intellectual capital.  It has been argued that the vast 
majority of papers in the intellectual capital field are focused on reporting how 
organisations struggle with accounting for, i.e. measuring and reporting, intellectual 
capital. To a significant extent, this work is unquestioning of the practices 
themselves, as well as the thinking that underpins them (Mouritsen & Roslander, 
2009). 
 
The inclusion of workers’ and other stakeholder group’s interests set out in the 1975 
“Corporate Report”, has shifted significantly over the past 35 years to a situation 
where contemporary financial reports are designed to serve the needs of 
shareholders and other providers of capital (IASB and FASB, Conceptual Framework) 
and as such are concerned with measuring and reporting the efficient production of 
profits by employees.  The effacing of workers needs in financial reports means that 
they are antithetical to accounting for human rights.  Since Charles Medawar’s 
seminal work in 1976 there has been a growing body of work challenging the 
production of useful accounts by corporate managers.  This work sets out a case for 
the production of reports by alternative commentators (Cooper, 2005b; Gray 2002).  
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Recent research on accountability has looked at how the provision of alternative 
forms of information could input into accountability relations and systems of 
accountability (see Milne et al., 2008; Ball, 2007;  Owen, 2007; Shenkin & Coulson, 
2007; Dey, 2007; Cooper, 2005; Dey, 2003; Everett, 2003; Owen et al., 2000; Gray et 
al., 1997).  These include, for example, conceptualisation and re-presenting 
internally derived information on which companies are “silent” and external 
“shadow” accounts reflecting on the performance of the company (see for example, 
Dey, 2003; Gray 2002; 1997).  
 
The production of shadow accounts and social audits is becoming common among 
campaigning non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as War on Want. NGOs 
have attempted to prise-open the legal organisational form and have questioned the 
accounting entity and formal units of account as the appropriate accountable entity 
by taking alternative supply chains and issues approaches. For example, the Friends 
of the Earth review of the source of finance behind Asia Pulp and Paper’s human 
rights abuse and environmental degradation includes the financing of their 
subsidiaries, related companies and their supply chain (Matthew & Willem van 
Gelder, 2002). Other issues based studies include, for example, student finance 
(Cooper et al, 2005), water footprinting, and accounting for war (Cooper & 
Catchpowle, 2009). Much of this research recognises that despite living in “the audit 
society”, human rights violations and abuses continue.  New forms of accounting 
research seek to make them visible.  
 
NGO initiatives have sometimes merged with trends in academic ‘activism’ in efforts 
to add legitimacy to ‘accounts’. Owen (2007) analyses trends among critical 
accountants to engage directly with groups such as trade unions as a counter to 
corporate capture through engagement (see also Neu et al., 2001; Owen et al., 2000; 
Cooper, 1995). However, in the UK at least, as corporate funding for research 
increases, the problem of corporate capture is difficult, if not impossible to 
overcome.  Mechanisms for engagement have arguably gone further with Shenkin & 
Coulson (2007) suggesting that informal, ethnographic methods of information 
provision may well be better suited to discharging a more social accountability, 
which necessarily provokes critical reflection on and in everyday life (see also Dey, 
2002).  
 
In other research settings, similar notions of a more 'socialising' form of 
accountability have been applied to the complex sets of relations between 
corporations, public institutions, community groups, trade unions, and activists, as 
well as between different sets of workers within organisations (see Richter, 
2001,Negri et al., 1999; Munro, 1996 Roberts, 1996; 1991). For example, Roberts 
(1996) discusses a reciprocal duty to every right that we want fulfilled, as it is ‘bound 
up’ with everyone else.  In some senses this idea of reciprocal duties is State doxa.  
Workers “willingly” go along with the legality of employers making money out of 
their labour and in return labour expects certain legal rights (for example not to be 
unfairly dismissed, the right to belong to a trade union and that workers will be 
protected by State health and safety legislation).  However, the unequal distributions 
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of the various forms of capital mean that Capitalists’ needs are privileged over 
labours’. 
 
One of the key challenges in accounting for human rights is the macro-meso-micro 
level management from universal principles of human rights to particular abstraction 
in everyday practice and conflicts of interest in social system where the means of 
abstraction serves to reinforce systems of domination. As Ignatieff (2001) writes 
“everyone’s universalism ultimately anchors itself in a particular commitment…the 
problem is that particularism conflicts with universalism at the point at which one’s 
commitment to a group leads to countenance of human rights violations toward 
another group,” (p. 9) Neu and Graham (2005), highlight the need to consider the 
“intersection of accounting and the public interest in a variety of settings” and the 
“multi-faceted nature of the nexus between accounting technologies, policies, 
practices, and society” (p. 589)6. Reflecting Bourdieu’s theoretical work, Neu and 
Graham (2005) unearth systems of social domination.  Focusing on the universal 
denies the nature of individual difference and ignores the influence of systems of 
social domination (including symbolic violence) which creates and maintains human 
rights abuses. Accounting for human rights needs to consider at a minimum the 
interests of the economic field alongside the dominant role of the State in 
maintaining economic capital and financial ‘narratives’ of legitimation that represent 
the interests of capital and neglect workers. 
 
Overall, research on accounting to/about employees, research on employee 
accountability and research on human rights, is focussed, in the main, at the macro 
or broadly theoretical level.  This paper attempts to consider these issues from a 
macro perspective in that it seeks to explore the societal structures at play while also 
grounding itself at the micro level in the empirical reality of the ICL tragedy.   Our 
purpose is to build on an emerging trend in academic accounting to analyse the 
scope and potential for political action geared towards social change (for example, 
Cooper, 2005; Everett, 2002; Neu et al., 2001). As our opening quote recognises, in 
many ways, Bourdieu strived to strike a balance between developing scholarly 
research that addressed deeply complex theoretical and methodological issues, and 
embarking on activities geared solely towards intervening in the public realm.  In 
order to more fully develop the micro-level function of accounting and its 
emancipatory potential, the next section considers the role played by ICL’s financial 
statements after the explosion. 
 
 
Accounting and ICL 
 
On a micro level accounting information formed the basis of the fine in the ICL 
criminal case for heath and safety violations.  On the last day of the Hearing in which 
                                                 
6
 The degree to which accounting academics, under the banner of public intellectuals, are able to play 
a mediating role in social structures and institutions, has been analysed previously and to 
considerable depth in the accounting literature (see, for example, Neu and Graham, 2005; Lehman, 
2001; Neu et al., 2001; Sikka and Willmott, 2005; Sikka et al., 1995; Sikka et al, 1991, 1989; Willmott 
et al., 1993).  
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ICL pleaded guilty to two health and safety charges, the defence QC handed the 
judge what appeared to be a single sheet of unaudited figures prepared by the 
company which set out the size of fine which the companies involved could afford to 
pay without their business interests being affected.  Several weeks later7, Lord 
Brodie, the sentencing judge, sentenced ICL Plastics and ICL Tech to each pay a fine 
of £200,0008 (See Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal, 2007). The, albeit unaudited, 
abbreviated accounts which had been lodged by the company at Companies House 
demonstrated the cash holdings were £897,511 (30th Nov 2003); £455,187 (30th Nov 
2004); and £749,950 (30th Nov 2005).  
 
Research has shown that fines are also often very small when taken in comparison to 
the profits of the companies they seek to penalise (Beck et al., 2007) and do not 
reflect the gravity of the harm caused. A number of accounting based suggestions 
have been put forward to try to redress this imbalance. The Centre for Corporate 
Accountability (2008; 2002) has proposed a formula for a unit fine that would take 
account of the gravity of the offence and ability to pay.  In this formula, the courts 
would set the fine percentage at a level that would reflect the seriousness of the 
offence.  This percentage would then be applied to an average of either the turnover 
or the profit of the firm over three years in order to determine the level of fine.  Such 
a system would be an obvious way to bring fines into line with the purpose of 
imposing punishments that are proportionate to the offence and to the offender’s 
ability to pay. However, because fines are levied on the organisation generally, 
rather than targeted at a particular group within the company, those costs can be 
absorbed by the organisation as it sees fit, this could include passing the costs to 
workers in the form of wage cuts or adverse changes in working conditions.  A better 
(and non-accounting) solution would involve custodial sentences.  This could involve 
senior management carrying on working for the organisation during the day but 
going to prison in the evening, overnight and at weekends.  The use of custodial 
sentences may provide a stronger deterrent than fines since individual actors would 
face prison.  
 
In terms of transparency, at best the accounts of ICL showed that the fine could have 
easily been paid by ICL out of its cash holding.  In the accounts, land and property 
were valued on a historic cost basis, and had been written down to almost negligible 
levels. It was estimated that the site at Grovepark Mills, where the explosion 
occurred, had an insurance value of £2.2m. This information was made available to 
the Court, yet despite this, Lord Brodie made it clear that “it would be inappropriate 
for the Crown to present an independent valuation of the accused companies” 
(Court of Session statement, 27th August).  The court deemed that sufficient 
information was available to determine the fine, roughly equal to £44,000 for every 
life lost in the explosion and without any accounting for those seriously injured.    
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th
 August, 2007 
8
 This fine could be compared to a fine of £121.5m imposed by the OFT and $300m (£150m) by the US 
department of justice in 2007 on British Airways for colluding over the setting of fuel-surcharges for 
cargo and long-haul passenger flights.  
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There were several financial factors which were not included in the conventional 
financial statements.  Following the two-day hearing at the Court of Session, the 
companies involved received a sum of £420,000 from their insurers, enough to cover 
the fine.  Moreover, the company still owns the land on which the factory was 
situated.  It has been reported that the cost of clearing the land to the local authority 
was £1m (as far as the authors are aware, the local authority has made no attempt 
to recover this cost from ICL).  The land is in a residential area and therefore has 
lucrative development potential.  Thus, because of the explosion ICL stand to make 
millions of pounds when it sells the land. 
 
The cash holdings of the company were fairly widely reported in the press and 
knowledge (albeit imperfect) of the cash holdings enabled interested parties to 
gauge the relative size of the fines.  Thus publicly available financial information, 
while limited, played a part in the struggle to hold ICL accountable.  However, in 
terms of representing and upholding the human rights of workers to health and 
safety at work the formal accounts of the ICL Group of companies were totally 
insufficient and they certainly proved to be an inadequate basis for establishing the 
fine. Similarly, in terms of reporting on or to employees little insight is offered as to 
the financial position of the group or the day to day management of ICL and risk of 
health and safety.   
 
Companies are judged upon their profitability.  The under (or hidden) side of this is 
of course worker exploitation.  To fully appreciate the extent of symbolic violence in 
the case of ICL it is necessary, as Bourdieu, advises to consider the role of the State 
and its agents complicit in the social system of domination in which ICL is only one 
part. In so doing, this also provides us with an opportunity to make visible the full 
extent of information that was available regarding health and safety at ICL in the 
period leading up to the disaster.   Thus in the next sections, we turn to the State and 
the Health and Safety Executive. 
 
 
The State and symbolism  
 
This section was developed from Bourdieu’s clarification of the importance of the 
state in the symbolic “system” which he originally delivered in a lecture in 
Amsterdam in June 19919.  He explained that at a fundamental level, from its 
genesis, the modern State had to claim to act for everyone within its geographical 
boundary’s (human) rights in order to achieve its aim of concentration of the 
different species of capital into its domain (field).  Indeed, Bourdieu (1998, p 41) 
argues that the State is the culmination of a process of concentration of different 
species of capital10: most notably – the capital of physical force or instruments of 
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 It was later published in 1994 (Bourdieu et al, 1994) 
10
 Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the capital of physical force.  Before the creation of 
modern States, most countries had various aristocrats/clans/tribes each with their own armies.  The 
modern State required control over all military force.  In states like Britain, all forms of capital of 
physical force have been ceded to the State.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this 
further but concerns have been expressed elsewhere about the use of privatized military force in Iraq.  
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coercion (army, police); economic capital; cultural (or better) informational capital; 
and symbolic capital (see Bourdieu, 1986).  It is this concentration which constitutes 
the State as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of 
capital and over their holders.   The concentration of the different species of capital11 
led to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital which enabled the State to 
exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular species of 
capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over 
the relations of force between their respective holders).  In the creation of modern 
States, there were battles and struggles over which capitals would dominate.  For 
example, in the UK the capital of physical force does not play the same dominant 
role as it does in other States (for example Israel)12.   
 
Assuming the mantle of acting in the “public interest”, a key function of the modern 
State is to bring about, theoretical unification.  Asserting that it is taking the vantage 
point of the whole, of society in its totality, the State claims responsibility for all 
operations of totalisation (especially census-taking and statistics or national 
accounting) and of objectivization (through cartography). The State further 
contributes to the unification of the cultural market by unifying all codes, linguistic 
and juridical; through classification systems (especially according to sex and age) 
inscribed in law; through bureaucratic procedures; and through educational 
structures and social rituals.  In short, the State moulds mental structures founded 
upon the belief (however untrue) that it will protect the human rights of its citizens 
while at the same time imposing common principles of vision and division (e.g. 
male/female; solvent/insolvent; employed/unemployed; graduate/non-graduate 
and so on).  
 
Thus, the State symbolic system performs three distinct functions: cognition 
(knowledge), communication (instruments of knowledge/codes), and social 
differentiation (integration/ structuring structures).  Swartz (1997, p 89), recognised 
that, “for Bourdieu, symbolic power legitimizes economic and political power but 
does not reduce to them” due to misrecognition and complicity. This reinforces the 
importance of revealing symbolic power as well as economic power when examining 
domination and, as Swartz notes (1997, p88), stressing the primacy that legitimating  
(or consent) plays in enabling domination. In particular, the active role played by 
taken for granted assumptions or preconceived thematics in the maintenance of 
power relations.  
 
Bourdieu believed that theories of the genesis of the State have failed to consider 
the importance of the concentration of a symbolic capital of recognised authority 
within the State as the condition of all other forms of concentration of the different 
                                                 
11
  This proceeds hand in hand with the construction of the corresponding fields 
12
 Bourdieu did not see the State as “the dominant field”.  To Bourdieu, the construction of the State 
proceeds apace with the construction of a field of power, defined as the space of play within which 
the holders of capital (of different species) struggle in particular for power over the State, that is, over 
the statist capital granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction. 
Bourdieu argues that their reproduction take place particularly through the school system  
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species of capital.  Symbolic capital is any property (any form of capital whether 
physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed 
with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to 
give it value.  More precisely, symbolic capital is the form taken by any species of 
capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception that are the 
product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure 
of the distribution of this species of capital (strong/weak, large/small, rich/poor, 
cultured/uncultured, educated/ignorant, modern/old-fashioned, expert/lay-person).  
It follows that the State, which possesses the means of imposition and inculcation of 
the durable principles of vision and division is the site par excellence of the 
concentration and exercise of symbolic power.   
 
However, as gestured to in the introduction, to Bourdieu, in order to understand the 
power of the State you need both “structural” explanations as well as “symbolic” 
ones.  The State creates organisational structures which support its symbolic ones. 
The contemporary symbolic order rests on the imposition upon all agents of 
structuring structures that owe part of their consistency and resilience to the fact 
that they are coherent and systematic (at least in appearance) and that they are 
objectively in agreement with the objective structures of the social world.  It is this 
immediate and tacit agreement that founds the relation of what Bourdieu describes 
as doxic submission.  Bourdieu introduced the term “doxa” in 1977a (p 164).  Doxa 
refers to those schemes of thought and perception which are produced by objective 
social structures but are experienced as natural and self evident and therefore taken 
for granted.  Bourdieu (1990, p20) explained doxa as- 
 
the coincidence of the objective structures and the internalised structures 
which provdes the illusion of immediate understanding, characteristic of 
practical experience of the familiar universe, and which at the same time 
excludes from that experience any inquiry as to its own conditions of 
possibility  
 
The constituents of doxa are all those systems of classification which set limits upon 
cognition but also produce a misrecognition of the arbitrariness on which they are 
based (Mahar et al, 1990).   
 
Doxic submission attaches us to the established order with all the ties of the 
unconscious.  In a capitalist State, many of the objective structures are centred on 
serving the needs of the market.  Indeed, as we discuss later, UK state classification  
insists that what is good for business is also good for society.  This has become one 
of the pre-conceived thematics which control meaning.  Symbolic (and consequently 
economic) support for the market is differentiated from support (say) for the 
needy13.  We unconsciously value profit over loss.  This preconceived thematic 
means that we unconsciously “accept” worker exploitation alongside disagreeing 
                                                 
13
 One interesting example of this is that state’s advertising campaigns against “benefit cheats” which 
could be compared to the state’s approval of millionaire “tax cheats”. For example, Phillip Green’s use 
of his wife’s  Monaco resident status meant that he avoiding millions of pounds in tax that would be 
payable if a UK resident owned the company; he was rewarded by a knighthood.  
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with laws which cost companies money and are described as a restraint of trade (like 
health and safety legislation).  In the following section we analyse a field which has 
been granted State symbolic capital – the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  As will 
be clear from the foregoing discussion, the HSE can (and does) serve to reinforce the 
state’s claim to act in the interests of all its citizens.  However, it is also an arena 
which is seen as problematic (especially if its existence becomes too onerous for 
business).  
 
 
The HSE 
 
The HSE is a UK “non-departmental public body” sponsored by the Department for 
Work and Pensions. As such, it is funded by public money with authority to appoint 
staff and allocate spending under the governance of a board of directors. It was 
created on 1 January 1975 by the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, in the wake of 
the Robens’ Committee (1972) recommendations on Health and Safety at work 
reform, and forms part of a programme of British regulation dating back to the 1833 
Factory Inspectorate (Factories Act 1833). While the Executive Board originally 
reported to the Health and Safety Commission the two bodies were merged in April 
2008. Its role with, few exceptions14, is to enforce health and safety legislation in all 
workplaces in England, Wales and Scotland.  Its State granted symbolic power 
aligned with UK legal structures enables the HSE to enter workplaces and if 
necessary take legal action against work activities which it considers to be 
dangerous.  This symbolic power is valued, in part at least, because it is founded on 
the belief that it is protecting the human rights of workers.  Moreover, doxa dictates 
that if a worker knows that unsafe working practices are taking place, their natural 
protector is the HSE. 
 
Therefore, in the case of the creation of the Health and Safety Executive, despite 
what might happen in practice, the State can claim that it has acted in the public 
interest by the creation of this body (and in some senses absolve its own 
responsibility for health and safety at work); it can also withdraw its symbolic capital, 
close the HSE and set up an entirely new body.  In this way the State has maintained 
its power while appearing to disperse it. A similar point is made by Mahon (1979) 
who sees the formation of such bodies as simultaneously representing and 
regulating. In this way the regulatory body can serve to prevent change or to act as 
an agent of change (Tombs, 1995; Post & Mahon, 1980).  
 
Symbolic pre-conceived thematics surrounding the role of the state makes it 
“rational” for a regulatory body to be a public agency, ‘independent’ of the control 
of private enterprise/ capital, with resources controlled at a restricted arms length 
by the State. Such an apparent structural position serves to create the legitimate 
authority of the HSE.  But what is the reality?  Research has shown the HSE is under 
resourced, with its scarce resources employed in pursuit of collaboration with 
management. Despite a recorded high of 4,545 staff employed by the HSE in 1994 
                                                 
14
 Except those regulated by Local Authorities and since April 2006 excluding the Railway Inspectorate 
now regulated separately by the Office of Rail Regulation. 
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(numbers have fluctuated, but total staff has never surpassed this high point) the 
HSE reported some 593 work related deaths in 2004-5 (Health and Safety Executive, 
2007). Further, of a reported 4,019 HSE staff on 1st April 2004 only 1,483 of those 
were front line operational inspectors. Arguably, the HSE has never been granted the 
resources to act as any kind of police force for the UK workplace despite being the 
lead enforcement agency for health and safety legislation (Toms, 1990). Recent data 
suggests that UK-wide the HSE is indeed increasingly de-emphasising its role as a 
health and safety enforcement agency, with a UK-wide fall of enforcement notices 
from 11,335 in 2003/4 to only 6,383 in 2005/06.15  In effect the cultural capital of 
HSE inspectors is not seen to be serving the direct interests of business and 
therefore commands a low exchange rate in society (as do many “social welfare” 
functions).  Moreover, the activities of the HSE following the State’s pre-conceived 
thematics, tends to represent the interests of capital over labour.  In spite of this, 
our doxic submission means that there is a tendency to view the HSE as the 
protector of workers’ human rights.   This is the same in both Scotland and England, 
however there are differences between the two countries.   
 
 
The HSE in Scotland 
 
There is a specifically Scottish habitus which has impacted on HSE activities in 
Scotland.  Over many years the HSE has recorded significantly higher rates of fatal 
and major injuries for Scotland as compared to the UK as a whole. For example, 
between 1996/7 and 2005/6 Scottish employees have averaged 58% higher rates of 
fatality than the UK overall.  Attempts to explain this ‘Scottish anomaly’ have failed 
to reach common agreement, however, explanations include weaknesses in the 
inspection and prosecution of safety offenders. Beck et al (2007) illustrate this point 
noting at the time of the Stockline disaster the HSE reportedly had only 68 inspectors 
to police 81,000 workplaces, in a UK-wide context where inspection has been de-
prioritised.  
   
This concerning evidence should be set within the specific structure of the legal field 
in Scotland.  This structure has meant that Scotland’s inspectorate arguably faces a 
greater challenge than England. In Scotland, prosecutions for health and safety 
offences must be made through the Procurator Fiscal office rather than being taken 
directly to court by HSE staff.  Research has shown that the impact of the de-
emphasis on enforcement has been aggravated by significantly lower fines issued by 
Scottish courts than their English counterparts (Beck et al, 2007).   
From a historical perspective, it appears that discrepancy in legal enforcement has 
always existed, particularly between England and Scotland. Marx (1976, p 401) 
recounts a divergence over the enforcement of a 15 hour factory day. When the 
home Secretary was overwhelmed by petitions from mill-owners, he instructed 
inspectors not “to lay information against mill-owners for a breach of the letter of 
the Act”. While the Scottish Inspectorate duly obliged, the English Inspectorate 
                                                 
15
 Health and Safety Commission (2006) Health and Safety Statistics 2005/06 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/overall/hssh0506.pdf 
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“declared that the Home Secretary had no dictatorial powers enabling him to 
suspend the laws, and continued their legal proceedings against the ‘pro-slavery 
rebellion’”.   
Commenting on the effectiveness of the Inspectorate Marx (1976 in Capital vol. 1) 
further highlights the distance between inspectors and “cotton lords” of the time 
when he refers to regulation of child employment as “the first rational bridle on the 
murderous, meaningless caprices of fashion”. Yet this rigor belies a subverted 
strengthening of the State and capitalism through increased labour regulation.  As 
noted by Marx (1976, p 604) as the industrial revolution in Britain advanced it was 
“helped on artificially by the extension of the Factory Acts to all industries”. Despite 
the claims by owners and managers that the cost of compliance required an 
unaffordable outlay of economic capital this served only to highlight that the 
“unlimited exploitation of cheap labour-power is the sole foundation of their ability 
to compete” and with the “improved method” of production regulated by the Act 
any initial economic outlay was absorbed (Marx, 1976, p 605). Further, regulation 
could often be obviated “at the expense of an enlargement of the works under the 
pressure of a General Act of Parliament” (Marx, 1976; p610, footnote 16).  Thus 
Marx described how Factory Acts, while seeming to serve the public interest, in 
reality helped the expansion of Capital.   
Thus the 19th century saw new regulation by the State which might have provided 
workers with individual and collective rights to health and safety at work.  Instead, 
“laissez-faire” ideology portrayed the new legislation as a curtailment of human 
freedoms which would stand in the way of economic progress.  The view of 
legislation as a restraint of (rather than an enabler of) human freedom persisted in 
the background throughout the 20th century and was brought to the fore by the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s.  Margaret Thatcher’s government 
tenaciously set about reinforcing pro-business categorizations – private good/public 
bad.   This has been developed to “business self-regulation good”/”government 
legislation bad”.  Moreover, calls for increased legislation in the realm of health and 
safety in the 21st century are categorized as demonstrative of our overly “risk averse 
culture”.  The trade union movement in Britain has from its inception taken an 
opposing view of government health and safety regulation (James and Walters, 
2005).  In the next section we briefly consider the role of Trade Unions in health and 
safety 
 
Trade Unions and Health and Safety 
Critical researchers (Carson, 1985) have pointed to legislative and regulatory 
weakness and the imbalance in the relationships between employers and employees 
as root causes of industrial injuries and illnesses.  Indeed research has demonstrated 
that the collective involvement of workers in the monitoring and development of 
health and safety arrangements in the workplace is a valuable means of improving 
standards of worker protection. Where workers are unable to exercise their rights 
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and are not collectively empowered through trade unions the health and safety 
deficit is evident.  Evidence suggests that twentieth and twenty-first century 
regulatory approaches to health and safety in the UK have added to this deficit, 
because of an implicit bias against the criminalisation of employers who commit 
safety offences (Beck and Woolfson, 2000).  HSE research confirms the academic 
consensus that trade union organised workplaces are at least 50% safer than non-
organised workplaces (for a discussion of this evidence, see James and Walters, 
2005).   
 
British trade unions in the 21st century possess high levels of cultural capital in terms 
of their training in health and safety, and high social capital in terms of their 
networks and connections.  This aligned to the potential for unions to carry out 
action to disrupt the economic activities of employers give trade unions some power 
over the monitoring and development of health and safety arrangements in the 
workplace.  Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of this, in the 21st century 
employers should benefit from the input of trade unions into health and safety 
processes.   Academic research lends “broad support to the notion that joint 
arrangements, trade unions and trade union representation on health and safety at 
the workplace are all associated with better health and safety outcomes than when 
employers manage OHS (occupational health and safety) without representative 
worker participation” (James and Walters, 2005, p 100).   Accordingly, any study of 
health and safety must pay attention to the adequacy of the provisions on worker 
representation and possible means of its improvement.  
 
Under current legislation employers have legal responsibilities to ensure the 
provision and exchange of information and instructions that enable employees to be 
properly informed about risks and health hazards, and to provide the training to 
allow employees to understand information and instruction16.  There are two 
principal sets of regulations that require workers to be consulted on health and 
safety matters.  The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 
is for workplaces where trade unions are recognised for collective bargaining 
purposes.  Recognising the exacerbated power imbalance in non-unionised 
workplaces, the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 
covers workplaces with no trade union recognition.   ICL worker testimony paints a 
picture of ICL as being virulently anti-union.  We will further see in the case study 
that the management of health and safety at ICL appears to have been characterised 
by an informality and laxity that left workers vulnerable to the vagaries of those 
responsible for its implementation.  There was clearly no system of health and safety 
consultation in place that could be regarded as complying with the 1996 Regulations.  
And yet, extant doxa (the view of the dominant that has become taken-for granted) 
suggests that unions serve to hamper business and that there is too much legislation 
                                                 
16
 Those legal responsibilities are detailed under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
and are repeated in many other subsequent health and safety regulations.  The Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 specify requirements on risk assessment (see the 
following case study), and the information that employers are required to provide to workers from 
the findings of any assessment.  In addition, employers have legal responsibilities to put formal 
mechanisms of consultation on health and safety matters in place.    
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in place, especially in respect of small businesses even though both of these fly in the 
face of the evidence.  
In the next section we set out Bourdieu’s theoretical explanation of how it is possible 
for “it to go without saying” that health and safety legislation is bad for business and 
thus should be minimized alongside a deeper consideration of the role which the 
Health and Safety Executive plays in the perpetuation of state sanctioned symbolic 
violence in the constitution of worker and employee subjectivities.   
 
Symbolic Violence and Health and Safety 
Through his own historical analysis of economic and social struggles, Bourdieu 
recognises there has been a historic move from overt violence with industrialisation 
to more symbolic violence17 (Bourdieu, 1977a; Swartz, 1997). For Bourdieu, there is 
an intelligible relation – not a contradiction – between overt and symbolic violence 
which “coexist in the same social formation and sometimes the same relationship” 
(Bourdieu, 1977a, p 191). It should not be forgotten, for example, that for many 
slavery was, and is some cases arguably still is, an accepted part of everyday life. 
However, as was explained earlier in the paper, the State does not necessarily have 
to exercise physical coercion in order to produce an ordered social world, as long as 
it is capable of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective 
structures and thus of ensuring doxic submission to the established order18. Doxa is 
the point of view of the dominant, which presents and imposes itself as a universal 
point of view – the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the State 
and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the State.  
Doxa is the breeding ground for symbolic violence.   
Famous for rethinking dichotomies of social theory, Bourdieu’s account of social 
violence (physical coercion) is distinct in that symbolic violence is achieved without 
consciousness or constraint. It is grounded in the ‘choices’ people make according to 
their specific habitus19 and their “illusio”, an unconscious commitment to the logic, 
values and capital of a field. The nature of symbolic violence means it is not 
recognised or, as Bourdieu elaborates through many examples of language and 
education, is misrecognised.  For example, such misrecognition has become a 
common basis for social analysis in gender studies where social behaviour is 
understood as “natural” or socially acceptable behaviour rather than acts or 
                                                 
17
 Collins (2003; 116) argues Bourdieu’s focus on dichotomy could be improved by the recognition of 
contradiction, in particular to resolve the tension with respect to language between social structural 
determination of verbal interaction – determinism – and a social creativity – constructivism.  
18
 Akin to Gramsci, Bourdieu believed that the State could control though consent (ideology) or 
through coercion (physical).  Bourdieu argues that the use of overt physical coercion or violence to 
explain the stability of capitalist social relations is incommensurate with the empirically observable 
realities of everyday life and therefore explanation must be sought in symbolic violence and the 
manufacture of consent (Calhoun et al., 1993; Garnham, 1993, p 184). 
19
 Habitus is the internalised schemes of thoughts and action which an actor develops according to 
her positioning in the field. 
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relationships of domination. The acts - words, gestures and intonations – of 
domination are not recognised as such, they are misrecognised as part of the doxa.  
Doxa serves to distinguish the thinkable from the unthinkable, reinforced by acts of 
distinction that obscure domination (Bourdieu, 1990).  
 
Part of their makeup is that acts of symbolic violence are socially established and 
unconsciously accepted. Within our social relationships and practice, complicity of 
the dominated is necessary if symbolic domination is to be realized. As highlighted 
by Bourdieu “the propensity to reduce the search for causes to a search for 
responsibilities makes it impossible to see that intimidation, - a symbolic violence 
which is not aware of what it is (to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation) - 
can only be exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it, whereas 
others will ignore it”... (Bourdieu, 1991, p 51).  Bourdieu’s extensive study of 
education illustrates how bodies of knowledge perform a reproductive function by 
communicating values of meanings of the existing social order to students who 
become predisposed to acceptance. For example, a child with a middle class accent 
and extended speech patterns may be rewarded by the teacher and so come to be 
seen as more intelligent.  Thus anything said in a middle class accent is seen by the 
child and her classmates to be “intelligent”.  Children with working class accents will 
“know” that they are less intelligent.  By making arbitrary cultural connection in a 
world where divisions and hierarchies are presented as necessary, a form of 
symbolic violence is enacted (see further Webb et al., 2002, p 118 on cultural 
arbitrary).   Cultural capital (for example, competencies, skills, qualifications) can also 
be a source of misrecognition and symbolic violence. Therefore, working class 
children can come to see the educational success of their middle-class peers as 
always legitimate, seeing what is often class-based inequality as instead the result of 
hard work or even "natural" ability. A key part of this process is the transformation 
of people's symbolic or economic inheritance (e.g. accent or money) into cultural 
capital (e.g. university qualifications). 
 
In the formation of symbolic violence there is a transmutation of economic into 
social capital.  This occurs when the interests of the economically dominant become 
doxic -- when they are concealed by a socially recognised authority legitimated by 
the State (as in the case with the HSE). Workers in 21st century Scotland’s identities 
and subjectivities are in part constituted by the belief that they are “subjects” in a 
democratic and fair system.  This view is reinforced by the existence of government 
agencies like the HSE and legal structures like the various Health and Safety at Work 
Acts.  Moreover, tragedies such as Bhopal have been characterised by the UK state 
and the British media as “the Other” and as an example of what can happen without 
the proper structures and regulations which we are fortunate to have in the UK.   
Yet, as set out in the previous section, the “protection” offered to Scottish workers 
by the HSE is a kind of charade with only 68 inspectors policing 81,000 workplaces at 
the time of the explosion.  This is why we describe Health and Safety practices as 
doxic.  
 
The question maybe posed  surely workers who see the charade of HSE enforcement 
in their workplaces cannot be so easily duped?  Debate on the robustness of 
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Bourdieu’s ‘theory’ of symbolic violence has centred on the extent to which workers 
are aware (misrecognise) and complicit in domination, and domination is illegitimate 
(see for example Bourdieu, 1977a; Calhoun et al., 1993 Swartz, 1997).   This issue will 
be discussed in the case study.  At this stage it is important to note that Bourdieu’s 
theoretical position is not pessimistic, an escape lies in critical reflexivity and the 
historical analysis of rational thought –“to rethink the subject-object dichotomies of 
classical and current social theory” - not just conflict in social relations and practice. 
“To fight for reason, for the undistorted communication that makes possible the 
rational exchange of arguments, etc, means fighting very consciously against all 
forms of violence, starting with symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, 2008, p 222-
3)....recognizing “the methodical historicization of the instruments of rational 
thought (categories of thought, principles of classification, concepts, etc.) is one of 
the most powerful means of removing them from history” (Bourdieu, 2008, p 223) 
People’s “common sense” notions about the workings of society were reformed 
during the 1980s when the Conservative government set about redefining/clarifying 
our understandings of the State and the private sector such that the private sector 
was categorised as being good-for-business (and by extension everyone), efficient, 
free and modern, while the State was categorised as bad- for-business (and by 
extension everyone), inefficient, constraining, and old-fashioned.  While these 
categorisations were not new, they were solidified.  In a piece published towards the 
end of his life (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), Bourdieu wrote that “the new 
planetary vulgate rests on a series of oppositions and equivalences which support 
and reinforce one another to depict the contemporary transformations advanced 
societies are undergoing - economic disinvestment by the state and reinforcement of 
its police and penal components, deregulation of financial flows and relaxation of 
administrative controls on the employment market, reduction of social protection 
and moralizing celebration of `individual responsibility' - as in turn benign, necessary, 
ineluctable or desirable, according to the oppositions”.    
 
The legacy of Thatcherite State categorisation is that government legislation is seen 
as inhibiting and damaging to “economic freedom.”  In terms of health and safety, 
there is a symbolic belief that any further regulation of health and safety is somehow 
both wrong and an ineffective means of achieving desired improvements.  Indeed it 
is “legitimate to reduce the resourcing of State regulatory activity on health and 
safety and replace it with exhortation and appeals to economic self interest of 
business to regulate itself, alongside a naïve reliance on untested notions about how 
the business environment provides its own levers and pressures to encourage 
effective self-regulation” (James and Walters, 2005, p xii).  Thus, while the HSE still 
stands as a structure to “protect the health and safety of employees”, neo-liberal 
state categorisations have legitimated cuts in HSE funding. 
 
It should be noted that at an individual level, the dominant framework of neo-
liberalism, is one that values individualism, and self-responsibility (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 2001).   At a subjective level this means that our “common sense” tells us 
to “look out for ourselves.”  For those who perceive themselves as “business 
people”, state categorisations serve to construct their subjectivity as being “naturally 
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opposed to state regulation of business”.    It cannot be stressed enough that such 
beliefs are deeply held and form part of individuals strategies as the act on fields. 
 
Putting acts of violence (our case study of ICL) into context means that it is necessary 
to analyse the objective mechanisms which help to establish and conceal relations of 
domination and also requires us to consider changes in capitals in terms of what 
Bourdieu aptly calls a “comprehensive balance-sheet of symbolic profits” (1977a, 
p181).  The following section sets out a detailed account of the activities of the HSE 
in its dealings with ICL and its LPG gas installation.  There were many important 
issues with regard to health and safety at ICL but we have chosen to concentrate 
mainly on the LPG pipes since it was a corroded LPG pipe which caused the 
explosion.  
 
 
 
The Habitus of health and safety practices at ICL and the doxic HSE 
 
The History 
The ICL building was a former weaving mill which had been constructed in 1857.  As 
will be seen from our discussions, the working environment of the 21st century 
workers may not have been so far removed from that of their Victorian 
counterparts.  The old mill was situated in a busy residential area and had passed 
through various hands during the years before it became the home of Industrial 
Copolymers Ltd Plastics (now ICL Plastics), which was founded on the site in 1961 by 
chemist Campbell Downie and colleague Ron Cunningham.  This building had 
undergone numerous alterations throughout the decades.  It originally had an open 
pit partly below ground level and an adjoining basement.  In 1980 the open pit area 
was covered by the creation of a freestanding floor. The ground floor of the building 
was approximately a metre above the external ground level.   
 
The history of the use of LPG at ICL began in 1969, when an LPG tank was installed in 
a yard outside of the ICL factory building.  The LPG gas would be used to fire ovens 
within the factory premises.  The installation was organised by Campbell Downie 
(one of the founders of the company).  He engaged Grieben Plant Limited to 
supervise the installation of the pipe.  The principal of Grieben Plant was the late 
Frank Semple, a former marine engineer and Downie’s bother-in-law.  The tank was 
connected to an underground pipe running beneath the yard and originally rose 
above ground (through two 90 degree bends in the pipe) to enter the building 
through a bricked up window into the open pit area.  At this time, the final section of 
the pipework rose vertically to about 0.45 metres above the original surface of the 
yard and was clearly visible.  Internally, the pipe was also visible in the pit area of the 
building.  However, to counter problems with flooding, the level of the yard was 
raised in 1973.  As a result, the LPG pipework was buried at the place where it 
entered the building.  In 1980 when the inside pit area was covered, the pipe ceased 
to be visible from inside the premises. (Insert fig 1 about here) 
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The LPG installation attracted the attention of HSE inspectors.  Indeed, the evidence 
from the Public Inquiry demonstrates that Campbell Downie (the controlling 
shareholder) and other senior staff at ICL’s attitude to health and safety provoked 
serious comment within the HSE20. The Public Inquiry carefully details occasions 
where the HSE were given information by ICL which later turned out to be factually 
incorrect and in all likelihood designed to delay HSE recommendations.  For example, 
in February 1982, the HSE submitted recommendations for improvements to the LPG 
tank which included the installation of a drench system.  In December, 1982, Frank 
Stott who was the responsible officer for health and safety at ICL Tech21 telephoned 
the HSE and later wrote confirming that the drenching system had been delivered 
and was to be installed during the Christmas shutdown period.  The Public Inquiry 
found that this representation cannot have been true.  Twenty two years later, at 
the date of the explosion, no drenching system had been installed.  This was not a 
minor oversight on behalf of a busy mid level manager.  The absence of a drench 
system and the advice of the HSE were known to the senior management at ICL.  
When the issue of the drenching system was raised six year’s later in April 1988, 
Stott responded to a memo from Downie on the significant cost of installing a drench 
system as follows “… we must try to talk them out of the drench but this will be 
difficult this time around…” (Gill, 2009, p 87).  In a later memo, Stott wrote to 
Downie that, “..I suspect that we have reached the end of the road in side stepping 
their requests (since 1982)….”  Downie replied “….  I am not unduly concerned with 
the Factory Inspectors displeasure….”   The habitus of ICL was one of stalling on HSE 
recommendations; meticulous attention to the cost of health and safety 
implementation and apparently holding the HSE in low regard or perceiving the HSE 
activities to be a “restraint of trade”.   
 
Recommendation 11 – the potential lifesaver 
Between 1975 and 1988 HSE inspections repeatedly expressed concerns about the 
siting of the LPG tank which was considered to be too close to the factory building.   
But in 1988, a key event in the history occurred when a specialist inspector visited 
ICL.  The HSE inspector, John Ives (who had experience of Inspecting ICL since 1981), 
attended that visit with Alan Tyldesley22 who had recently been recruited as a 
Specialist Inspector, working with the Field Consultancy Group dealing with fire and 
explosion.  Ives long association with ICL should have meant that he was aware of 
ICL’s habitus. 
 
It became clear during the Ives/Tyldesley visit that the siting of the tank, given its 
size, did not comply with the separation distances contained in HSE guidance 
HS(G)34.  The Public Inquiry noted that this was “a problem on which Mr Stott had 
successfully staled for so long” (Gill, 2009, p63).  The specialist (Tyldesley) stated that 
                                                 
20
 For example, on 1
st
 October 1975, an HSE Inspector noted that “Conditions in the factory have 
deteriorated considerably…”  In a letter to the procurator fiscal, proposing prosecution in light of ICLs 
failure to comply with Improvement Notices, Mr Downie was described as having an irresponsible 
attitude in connection with fire matters.   
21
 Frank Stott was the responsible officer for health and safety at ICL Tech until his resignation in 
1998, thereafter responsibility lay with Peter Marshall until 2000 and then with Stewart McColl. 
22
 http://explosionconsultancy.co.uk/ 
 23 
ICL should either try to convert their ovens which used LPG to natural gas, try to rent 
land further away from the factory to re-site the tank or to acquire smaller tanks.  In 
all Tyldesley made 12 recommendations.  For the purposes of this paper, 
recommendation 11 is the most poignant— 
 
Part of the underground pipework carrying LPG vapour into the building 
should be excavated.  The state of the pipework and any corrosive protective 
coating should be examined by a competent person and any 
recommendations made as a result of this inspection should be carried out.  
A pressure test23 of the pipework should also be carried out. (Gill, 2009, p66) 
 
In short, in 1988 a recommendation was made that the pipework should be dug up 
and checked.   If this had happened and the pipes had been correctly protected, it is 
highly likely that the explosion would never have happened.  In the subsequent trial 
relating to the explosion it was heard that the cost of renewing the pipe would have 
been £405. 
 
At the Public Inquiry, Tyldesley said that based upon ICL’s lack of action regarding 
HSE recommendations about the installation between 1982 and 1988, he felt that 
co-operation from ICL on his 12 recommendations without legal enforcement action 
would be unlikely.  Thus, his recommendations were intended to form the basis for 
an Improvement Notice under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  Ives, who 
had 34 years experience in the HSE had attended several LPG training courses but 
could not recall any discussions of pipelines, returned to ICL on 1st September, 1988,  
to discuss Tyldesley’s report with Stott.  The entry on the HSE Report on Visits form 
recorded that 
 
Mr Stott opened the meeting by announcing that he was transferring his 
oven from LPG to mains gas which will reduce the need for the LPG store.  It 
appears that a small tank will still be needed for the central heating system.  
Letter and CV (check visit24) proposed to ensure that Mr Stott keeps his word. 
(Gill, 2009, p 68) 
 
Ives later marked the file to cancel the check visit “as negotiations were underway”.  
The Public Inquiry Report stated that in the meeting between Ives and ICL, 
 
Mr Ives went through the recommendations in Mr Tyldesley’s report with Mr 
Stott (an ICL Director) during the meeting.    In relation to the pipework, Mr 
Stott did not think that excavating the pipe was a practical option as it would 
mean digging up the yard.  (Gill, 2009, p 68) 
 
The outcome of the meeting was that Stott was going to discuss the issue with a for-
profit company, Calor (its LPG supplier), and would return to the HSE with a new 
proposal.  Thus Stott made two completely contradictory statements during the 
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 A pressure test would show whether or not the pipework was leaking but would not determine the 
condition of the pipe. 
24
 This was marked for November 1988 
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same meeting.  If ICL truly intended to convert to natural gas they had no need to 
speak to their LPG supplier – they would have had to speak to a natural gas supplier. 
 
Calor and the field of power 
The matter effectively went into abeyance until Mr Stott discussed the matter with 
Calor.  In effect, a specialist HSE inspector’s cultural capital (his recommendations), 
perhaps because they were seen as “curtailing ICL’s freedoms”, was valued very 
lowly by everyone concerned (the HSE, ICL and as we shall see later, another private 
company, Calor).  Moreover, in allowing ICL to approach Calor, the symbolic capital 
of Calor was deemed to be higher than that of an HSE specialist. 
 
Stott did contact Calor.  He dealt with Mr Coville.  Coville and Ives knew each other 
well.  It became evident in the Public Inquiry that it was part of the habitus of the 
field for companies to contact Calor if they were having difficulties with the HSE.  The 
Public Inquiry stated that “He (Ives) and Mr Coville had had regular contact where 
persons with LPG installations sought guidance and where they were trying to 
resolve difficulties regarding such installations.  When incidents occurred they would 
work together to try to improve practices.”   
 
Coville (a Calor employee, but on behalf of ICL) wrote to Ives on 4th January 1989 in 
the following terms- 
 
…  On behalf of ICL Technical Plastics Ltd and following my telephone call to 
you on 23rd December 1988, the attached sketch plan outlines suggested 
suitable remedial action, to be taken by Calor Gas Limited, in order to meet 
the recommendations made at paragraphs 1, 2, 3, & 4, only of your above-
referenced letter…  I trust you will consider the above measures to form an 
acceptable compromise to your recommendations….” (Gill, 2009, p 69) 
 
In fact the Calor proposals were mainly concerned with the installation of a smaller 
LPG tank and the requirements for a certain distance between the tank and the 
building.  One of Tyldesley’s recommendations had been that ICL should replace the 
4,000 litre tank with a much smaller one of 250kgs.   It seems that Calor were unable 
to supply tanks of this size, and their counter proposals were concerned with 
installing a 2,000 litre tank.  Calor as a participant on the economic field would be 
concerned with keeping its clients.  If the HSE created too many problems for its 
clients, they might be tempted to convert to using another source of power.  For 
clients, like ICL, their preference would be to expend as little economic capital as 
possible converting to a different system.   
 
The Ives/Collville “counter-proposals” were referred to Tyldesley.  In a memo dated 
17th January, 1989, he replied to the counter proposal stating that the LPG 
installation would be acceptable if ICL could obtain nearby land on which to site the 
tank.  He also stated that he hoped “that appropriate enforcement action will now 
be taken to ensure that the installation is improved without delay.” (Gill, 2009, p 72).   
Tyldesley was clear that his recommendations had been a package and that it had 
not been a case where there could be picking and choosing.   Indeed, if ICL/Calor had 
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decided to install a smaller tank rather than resite the tank further away from the 
building, this would involve halting the supply and so would be a convenient time to 
check the underground pipework.  Tyldesley believed that Coville/Calor as 
“competent persons” would understand the need to check the pipework.   
 
In the event, Ives “pulled-rank” on Tyldesley.  Ives responded to Tyldesley on 20th 
January, 1989.  We will include a long quotation since it is important to understand 
the habitus of the HSE— 
 
I would remind you that enforcement policy in this matter rests with myself 
and I will take appropriate action as I see fit to deal with this matter.   
The problem that has arisen is that Calor Gas are telling the occupier and 
myself that they do not produce tanks for bulk LPG which meet the standards 
of your original report.  In other words if I were to enforce the letter of your 
report then this site would have to cease using LPG.  In those circumstances I 
deem it better that we try to reach a reasonable compromise and solution 
rather than rush into enforcement action which will backfire.  In view of 
Calor’s claims perhaps you could confirm that it is possible for them to supply 
tanks of volume no greater than 250kgs.25 
 
It is clear that doxic submission to the needs of economic capital accumulation by 
the HSE played a key role in Ives’s actions. Ives seemed concerned that ICL would be 
able to continue using LPG.  The actors’ strategy ensured that the needs of capital 
were privileged over health and safety at work.  The HSE’s symbolic power derives 
from its claim to act to protect the health and safety of workers and yet it seems that 
they are able to compromise on this. 
 
However, there was also another factor at play in Ives’s actions.  Lord Gill at the 
Public Inquiry (Gill, 2009, p 94) stated that “it is clear from Mr Ives’ evidence about 
the Calor counter-proposal that his decision to accept it was influenced, in part at 
least, by his fear of the consequences if he should reject it.  It was well known to the 
Inspectorate that Calor had a history of challenging HSE enforcement notices.  This is 
the operation of the field of power. Calor’s economic capital and its ability to pay for 
the cultural capital of the best lawyers made it a much stronger adversary to the HSE 
than ICL.   Gill (Gill, 2009, p 94) then writes “ Calor consider themselves to have a 
constructive relationship with HSE and reject any suggestion that they intimidate 
HSE when they occasionally seek to assist their customers to resolve any potential 
enforcement notice issue.  I myself make no such suggestion.”   
 
Calor had legal representation throughout the public Inquiry.  They seemed very 
keen to assert that their counter-proposals to Tyldesley met with HS(G)3426, a claim 
contested by other witnesses to the Inquiry.  Gill  wrote that (Gill, 2009, p 99), “In my 
view, for so long as Calor contractually accepted no responsibility for pipework 
beyond the vapour off-take valve, it was at least a tenable position for them to say 
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 Telephone enquiries to other gas suppliers indicated that tanks of 200kg and 600kg were available 
elsewhere (although perhaps not from Calor). 
26
 HS(G)34 Storage of LPG at fixed installations, HSE, 1987 
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that the buried pipework was a matter for the user alone.  But they could not 
maintain that position when they agreed to advise and represent ICL in its 
negotiations with HSE.”  In effect the LPG industry is self regulating.  The threat of 
legal action against Ives by Calor should be seen as part of the struggle by economic 
capital to have power over the State.   
 
In 1989 HSE protocol was that all actions and correspondence were directed through 
a general inspector.  This meant that Tyldesley would not have known whether his 
recommendations were applied or not.  In the event, Ives while not pursuing 
recommendation 11, did pursue the resiting of the tank.  This would have meant that 
ICL would have had to acquire adjacent land.   
 
Stott wrote to the HSE on 25th January 1989 to say that he could “now confirm that 
we are in fact in control of the land out with our main factory gate...”.  The letter 
also gave other details about relocation of parking and so on.  The Public Inquiry 
found that Stott’s letter was plainly untruthful and designed to mislead.  No ICL 
company, then or since has had control of the land.  Colville visited ICL in December 
1989 and drew up a further plan probably as a consequence of being told that ICL 
had control of the land.  In January 1990, Colville spoke to Ives.  Ives reported that 
the new proposal seemed satisfactory.  A check visit due in March 1990 never took 
place.  Almost eighteen months later in June 1991, Calor replaced the 2-tonne (4,000 
litres) tank with two 1-tonne tanks.  At the time of the explosion, some of the 
Ives/Coville compromise plan had not been completed. 
 
The Audit Society and the HSE 
In 1993, the habitus of the HSE changed slightly in that companies were legally 
obliged to appoint one or more competent persons to carry out risk assessments in 
the workplace.  The next HSE visit to ICL in January 1992, and visits subsequent to 
this demonstrated the new approach to health and safety audit by the HSE.  In 
practical terms this change served to devalue the cultural capital of HSE inspectors 
further, since the onus of reporting risks was removed from them and was placed on 
companies - a form of self-regulation consistent with state categorisation and 
distinction of public and private spheres.  Indeed the new approach is more akin to 
the statistical sampling, negotiated compromise (between auditor and auditee) and 
light-touch of financial accounting auditing.  The inspector who carried out this visit, 
Alistair McNab, carried out a “diagnostic inspection” which meant that he “sampled” 
activities with a view to diagnosing any problems with the management of health 
and safety.   The Public Inquiry stated that the “purpose was not to check every 
single hazard or risk or activity in the factory, for it was impractical for him to do so 
and that was in any event the responsibility of the duty holder (itals added) (Gill, 
2009, p 76).  McNab concentrated on the management and on the director roles and 
was concerned that the company should be ready to audit itself for risk.  McNab’s 
visit was in part to prepare ICL for its obligations to appoint one or more 
“responsible officers” to assist in identifying risks within the workplace and to 
develop measures to minimise these.  These obligations were to become mandatory 
for employers on 1 January 1993.    
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Interestingly, at the Public Inquiry, Lord Gill had something to say about HSE 
guidance on pipes.  It seems that HS(G)34 was the vaguest of them all.  A witness to 
the Inquiry, Dr Fulham, told the Inquiry (Gill, 2009, p 95, itals added) that “…it 
reflects the general move towards a risk based approach… where you don’t give such 
specific detail but where you allowed a competent person (e.g. Calor) to use their 
judgement…”  Given ICL’s habitus (resisting HSE recommendations), which was well 
known by the HSE, how could one of their senior management be deemed to be a 
responsible officer?  This is an example of the violence involved in the move towards 
risk based assessments.  Given ICL’s history, one would trust the HSE not to trust ICL 
and yet this is exactly what happened. 
 
McNab’s visit served a dual purpose since it was also deemed to be the “check visit” 
to follow up on the LPG gas recommendations.  McNab added a handwritten 
addition to his report of the visit “LPG seems to meet 1990 agreement”.  In fact the 
agreement with Calor had not been fully implemented.  After 1993, there was no 
further mention of the LPG installation in the HSE files.  Thus it seems that 
recommendation 11 was effectively filed away and forgotten until the explosion.  
While, as we set out below, this could be seen as a “one-off” error, it is exemplary of 
the structure and doxa of the HSE.   
 
It is likely that if the workers of the factory were aware of Tyldesley’s 
recommendations, then the pipe corroding in the ground might not have been 
forgotten.  The social capital of workers only serves to empower worker actions 
against known adversaries.  But in this case, the workers did not have access to the 
cultural capital (nor the recommendations) of Tyldesley.  Indeed the risk assessment 
at ICL was to be carried out by a full time student without Tyldesley’s cultural capital.  
What this student had however was social capital. 
 
Andrew Stott (Frank Stott’s son) a full-time university student studying Human 
Resource Management , was asked to carry out a self-evaluation risk assessment by 
his father (Frank Stott) or William Masterson.  The public Inquiry seemed to think 
that he had made a reasonable attempt at the assessment.  However, Andrew had 
not thought about the buried LPG pipework so the pipe did not form part of the 
assessment.  Frank Stott however, did know about it, Tyldesley’s recommendation 
had been specifically discussed with him by Ives.   Andrew Stott’s involvement in 
preparing the draft assessment finished in January 1997.  The final form of 
assessment was dated 16th July 1997.  Later risk assessments perpetuated the error 
of not including the buried pipework.   The maximisation of profits is part of the 
illusio of the economic field.  This means that leaders of organisations on this field 
will only be prepared to spend economic capital on health and safety if it will bring 
economic returns to their organisation.  Thus when managers assess health and 
safety risks they are concerned about the risk relating to economic capital.  Of course 
if damage to workers is economically or symbolically costly to companies (perhaps 
because of disruption to production) then this risk will also be considered.    
 
The issue as to whether or not the error perpetuated by Andrew Stott’s risk 
assessment could have been prevented if had been carried out by someone else is 
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clearly one of conjecture.  While not possessing the cultural capital of Tyldesley, 
many workers at ICL were aware of the risks associated with their work. However, as 
a non-unionised site they had no organised basis to petition management for 
information nor to protect them if they attempted to raise health and safety issues 
with management. 
 
The cultural capital of workers 
Workers’ testimonies constitute a powerful indictment of the general approach to 
health and safety management taken by management at ICL. They reveal the routine 
disregard of health and safety legislation and statutory regulations, including serious 
breaches of COSHH regulations. There are many graphic examples of this negligence, 
of which the following complaint following exposure to chemicals is quite typical.  
 
But I was working with this stuff [gold paint supplied by Trimite] one day – I 
never had any gloves on – and all this paint was getting stuck to my fingers 
and up my nails and in my hair. I never thought of looking at the actual tin 
that [this fellow worker] was using and it was only when I seen a skull and 
crossbow on the tin that I thought, ‘There’s something wrong with the stuff 
we are using’. So I took a closer look and I complained to Bill Masterton that I 
was getting a tingling feeling in my hands. I complained for weeks and weeks. 
Bill’s like this, ‘Och, it’s just work, go and wash your hands every time you are 
finished using it. I said ‘But I’m still getting the tingling sensation’ *after I 
wash my hands]. So I read the actual thing on it and it says, ‘the downside 
effect of this paint is if it comes into contact with your skin is that you could 
get a tingling sensation, which is irreversible. Irreversible on the tin! I’m like 
that ‘I’ve got this and it’s irreversible’. So I pointed that out to Bill. I said, 
‘Look at the back of that tin, you should have told me before I started even 
touching that paint that I had to have gloves on, or special gloves, and see the 
smell of this stuff’. (Beck et al, 2007, p 10) 
 
Presaging the cause of the explosion, workers reported that they were aware of 
serious problems that had emerged with regard to the gas pipes.  
 
Somebody came in and condemned the gas pipes. For about a week or two 
we had no gas. The thing is we were led to believe it was the Health and 
Safety (Executive) because I know for a fact that somebody did complain 
because they were having odd job men *working on them+…one of the guys 
actually phoned the health and safety and pointed out that they had odd job 
men working on the gas pipes, shouldn’t it be somebody who is CORGI27 
registered working on the gas pipes. I’m not 100% sure if they came in, if they 
contacted them or what they did, but there was talk they came in around 
that time as well. (W2) (Beck et al., 2007, p10). 
                                                 
27
 In 1991 the Health & Safety Executive changed legislation in Great Britain relating to gas work; 
introducing the requirement that anyone working on gas must be “a member of a class of persons”. 
This class of persons is defined by registration with a new mandatory gas safety scheme, which HSE 
asked CORGI to act as registrar of. CORGI became the “Council for Registered Gas Installers” at this 
time. 
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They built the oven themselves…And then they had to get people in for the 
gas burners and I think that’s what it was. I think it was them that noticed 
that something was wrong. They condemned. They actually cut the gas off. 
They said, under whatever regulations they work under, that they found 
dangerous pipes, so they were going to disconnect them. So they 
disconnected them and left. Then what happened was it was like the two 
handy men in the place, they were called out. They started working on them 
to sort the leaks. So it was like a spray they got and what they did was they 
would put the gas on and they went along the pipes spraying it all and 
identifying leaks. And then they would fix them. But the pipes were never 
replaced (W4) (Beck et al., 2007, p10). 
 
As stated earlier, since there was no trade union recognition agreement at ICL, it 
appears that the factory would fall under the Health and Safety (Consultation with 
Employees) Regulations 1996.  Under the 1996 regulations it is the responsibility of 
the employer to ensure that a system for consulting workers on health and safety is 
in place.  In such a case, the regulations allow for the company to choose between a 
system of consultation through a safety representative elected by the workforce or a 
system of direct consultation with employees.  According to workers’ testimonies 
provided by Beck et al. (2007), there was no elected representative of employee 
safety at ICL.  This means that the company was obliged to consult directly with the 
workforce.  This information, according to HSE guidance must include information 
from accident books, and any assessments that have been made under COSHH 
regulations.  Workers’ testimonies Beck et al. (2007), provide clear evidence that 
ICL’s organisation of health and safety representation fell well short of legal 
compliance. 
 
Overall, management of health and safety appears to have been characterised by an 
informality and laxity that left workers vulnerable to the vagaries of those 
responsible for its implementation.  From the testimonies of staff (Beck et al.,2007), 
there appeared to be no system of health and safety consultation in place that could 
be regarded as complying with the 1996 Regulations.  One worker summed up the 
lack of representation and adequate communication of information from 
management: 
 
There was absolutely nothing [in the way of formal consultation between 
employer and employees+ no health and safety committee…If I remember 
right, there was a notice on the wall about Factory Acts or something, you 
know, but that was about it really. If the company had a policy regards safety 
or [specific hazards] in all the years I was there nobody ever said to me 
anything about it. (Interview Laurence Connolly Snr. 16 January 2006, Beck et 
al., 2007) 
 
Given the foregoing it is surprising that no legal action was taken against ICL under 
the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996.   
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Perhaps one of the most telling employee cases is that of Laurence Connolly senior 
who had been a worker at ICL for 13 years.   He left their employment just days 
before the disaster and had personal experience of inviting the HSE to investigate his 
concerns for health and safety at ICL.   Laurence’s relationship with the HSE began 
when he developed concerns regarding working practices at ICL which he believed 
were having a serious impact on his son’s ill health (Laurence Connolly junior, a co-
worker). Laurence pursued his own course of inquiry.  He said –“I couldn’t find out 
anything in the work so I started looking on the Internet and I started finding out 
some bits and pieces myself.  And then when I started reading it, it became very 
frightening because a lot of the problems that Laurence has had and is still having, 
you could actually read through these data sheets on all these chemicals and it’s 
telling you some of the effects that they can have on you.  At the same time, they 
are telling you that you should be wearing certain types of masks, certain types of 
gloves, impervious overalls, and all these sort of things.  We never got anything like 
that.”  (Beck et al., 2007; P114).  So Lawrence took his health and safety concerns in 
the first instance to ICL management as a legitimate authority for health and safety 
practice but when faced with at best what could be described as a lack of interest by 
management, Laurence doxically turned to the HSE, as a regulator of health and 
safety for help. He made numerous calls to the HSE, many unreturned.  Indeed he 
felt that he was being stone-walled by the HSE.   
 
Paradoxically, during one of their visits to ICL, a senior member of ICL introduced the 
HSE inspector to Lawrence only for Lawrence to have his identity exposed to ICL 
management as the person requesting the inspection visit.   It is this act that forms a 
further contradiction in the case. On the HSE’s official website28 under “Your 
employer’s responsibilities” the HSE draw attention to the following –  
 
“If you think your employer is exposing you to risks or is not carrying out their 
legal duty in regards to health and safety, and you have pointed this out to 
them without getting a satisfactory response, you can contact us. We treat 
all contacts in strictest confidence29.”  
 
Laurence’s account further illustrates a failing by management and the HSE to 
provide workers with access to official ‘accounts’ of health and safety and leaving 
them without the power to manage risks to their health and safety.   This was not 
the end to the violence however; Laurence illustrates how the discourse of health 
and safety was used as a tool for control over the ICL workforce and a means of 
victimisation. As we describe later, the management of ICL would use the discourse 
of health and safety to control the workers. Eventually when Laurence’s position 
became untenable at ICL after he was exposed by the HSE inspector as a whistle-
blower, he left ICL (some three weeks before the disaster). This can be viewed 
through the lens of Bourdieu as a voluntary alienation from a dominant system. The 
whole saga also exposes Connolly’s relative weakness in the field of power.  He has 
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 Further emphasis is added by a link to a section on “Whistleblowing” quoting –“the law provides 
them with protection if they 'blow the whistle' on their employer.” 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/workers/whistleblowing.htm) 
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 http://www.hse.gov.uk/workers/employers.htm 
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little economic capital (which could be used to mount a legal challenge to the HSE or 
ICL); moreover, in spite of his knowledge of ICL, he was deemed to have little of the 
requisite form of cultural capital in the HSE field. 
 
Debate on the robustness of Bourdieu’s ‘theory’ of symbolic violence has centred on 
the extent to which workers are aware (misrecognise) and complicit in domination, 
and the extent to which domination is illegitimate (see for example Bourdieu, 1977a; 
Calhoun et al., 1993 Swartz, 1997). This is particularly relevant to our case; disclosure 
of Laurence’s identity by HSE inspectors to ICL management illustrates a conscious 
recognition of violence (dichotomy between social relation and practice) in which 
Laurence is no longer complicit in Bourdieu’s sense of the word. This is a turning 
point in the case; from this point Laurence no longer adheres unquestioningly to the 
relations of order. In this instance violence is arguably no longer symbolic 
(misrecognised/ complicit) violence it now represents a more elementary form of 
overt economic violence (irrespective of the inspector’s conscious or unconscious 
motive for action).  
 
 
The HSE’s habitus of self-protection 
While the ICL explosion may be a specific case, it reflects the nomos and habitus of 
the field in which employers are offered advice, consultation and negotiation before 
enforcement action is taken.  In other words, the work of the HSE is structured 
around a ‘compliance’, rather than a ‘strict enforcement’, model of regulation 
(Pearce and Tombs, 1990; Tombs and Whyte, 2007).  Except in the case of the most 
egregious safety offences, enforcement action is invoked only where processes of 
persuasion, negotiating and bargaining, often over a very protracted period, have 
proven 'unsuccessful' and even then consequential battles on the juridical field can 
prolong and hamper HSE recommendations.  The HSE habitus means that the law is 
indeed, the ‘last resort’ (Hawkins, 2002) when it comes to the discovery, 
investigation, and response to, health and safety offences.  In this way the HSE is 
protected from doing battle on the juridical field on which it is ill equipped (in terms 
of its own capitals) to win. 
 
Further, violence is enacted through the consolidation of the compliance approach 
by a government agenda that ensures the HSE’s acceptance at a corporate level of 
the need to take into account regulated industries’ commercial constraints and the 
need to balance regulatory goals with the economic ‘health’ of the nation (Tombs 
and Whyte, 1998).  What arguably adds to violence in this case of ICL – entirely 
reminiscent of examples from Victorian Britain - is the use of regulation to exert 
control over labour on one hand, while on the other, systematically sanctioning  
breaches in regulation by capital.  For example, a former worker of ICL noted an 
instance symbolising such an act of control, “Chemicals could lie all over the place 
and that wasn’t a problem.  But if you had a bottle of water or a bottle of Irn Bru30 
on your bench then that was a major health and safety issue” (Beck et al., 2007, p 
20). There are therefore important symbolic and structural pressures that have acted 
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 A popular Scottish soft drink 
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to construct HSE as a body which must cooperate with and advise industry rather 
than as a law enforcement agency (Pearce and Tombs, 1998).   
 
While an HSE inspector did not respect the confidentiality of Lawrence Connelly, the 
authors have had direct experience of HSE’s rigorous concern for its own reputation. 
The HSE insisted that an Independent academic report on the explosion was 
removed from the Strathclyde University website.  After the explosion Tyldesley also 
posted a statement on his own website but Brechin Tindal Oatts (solicitors) who 
acted for the HSE at the time told him to remove the web page.  During the Public 
Inquiry Tyldesley said that “… It seems that once the legal processes start, the word 
“sorry” becomes very difficult to say….”   
 
In summary, the ICL explosion was a preventable disaster.  The HSE had the requisite 
cultural capital to understand the risks involved with buried LPG pipes which entered 
into enclosed spaces.  Rather than simply perceiving the events which led up to the 
explosion as a series of “mistakes”, we argue that by using Bourdieu’s scientific 
method it is possible to discern some of the “logics” of the social world which need 
to be rectified to prevent similar abuses of our human rights from happening in the 
future.   
 
An element of the case which demonstrates the powerful illusio (drive to make 
profits) of the economic field is that the concern for economic returns at the 
expense of health and safety endangered everyone in the company including those 
who knew about the pipe.  Indeed Downie’s son was injured in the explosion. And 
the Chief Executive was killed.  Frank Stott allowed his son to work there.  Thus the 
people who worked at ICL, who knew about the pipe and who were in a position to 
do something about it, put their own and their loved-one’s lives at risk.  This could 
perhaps be explained by their failure to recognise the danger of the pipe.  But the 
application of Bourdieu’s theoretical work suggests that deeper forces were at play.  
The somatic reaction to HSE inspectors by the owner and ICL management was one 
of hostility.  Their constitution as the owner and/or managers of small businesses 
was controlled by preconceived thematics and these thematics were reinforced by 
structural changes to the Health and Safety executive.  The management/owner 
view of “reality” meant that they failed to appreciate the danger to themselves, their 
loved-ones, and in the final analysis to their workforce.   In this case the view of the 
dominant paradoxically did not serve their interests. 
 
In this case study we have described the strategies of various actors who were 
involved in the ICL explosion.  We have set their actions within the framework of 
Bourdieu’s symbolic violence noting both the objective state structures and the 
mental dispositions of the actors.  Finally we have highlighted the various capitals at 
play in the case.  The next section considers how the theoretical and practical 
insights derived from the case could be used to develop a new form of Accounting 
for Human Rights. 
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Reflections on the accounting lesson from ICL- How to account for human rights 
 
The disaster at ICL acts to highlight the failure of management, regulation and 
inadequacy of law to police the economic system in spite of state claims to the 
contrary.  To ‘account’ for human rights we need to consider ‘accounts’ in their 
cognitive, communicative and political form -  ‘accounts’ reside in each, formalised, 
legitimised and reinforced. If safe working environments and not being killed or 
injured at work are human rights then these rights are being abused.   In order to 
overturn this violence we need to both understand its complex roots and try to 
invoke measures which would restore equality on the field of power. 
 
One way of helping to address this imbalance would be to produce a new form of 
health and safety account.  This account should contain several different elements.   
 
Firstly, it should contain two documents – the unabridged HSE Inspectors’ reports 
and the company risk assessment.  Because of the potential for “negotiation and 
compromise” on the part of the HSE, reports should be shown to management and 
workers at the same time, before any discussion and negotiation takes place.  The 
cultural capital of workers would be enhanced by HSE reports and company risk 
assessment.  There is no question that they would be “too technical.”  Tyldesley’s list 
of 12 recommendations was clear and could easily be understood by lay-people (like 
the authors).  One can only imagine how things may have been different if 
recommendation 11 was known by the workforce.  When self-evaluations started in 
1993, the staff could have insisted that the pipe (and the fact that it hadn't been 
checked) was listed as a risk factor.  As set out above, a director of ICL, KNEW about 
the risk and did not want to incur even the small cost of digging up the yard.  
Although Stott's son carried out the risk assessment, Tyldesley’s  12 
recommendations never featured in his assessment.  So after 1993, no-one ever 
thought about the buried pipe.  The symbolic violence is that the State sanctioned 
structures aligned to the mental dispositions of management prevented the 
workforce from being able to take any responsibility for this risk to their health and 
safety.  
Under UK health and safety legislation employers must provide workers with 
information about risks in their workplace, how they are protected and instruction 
and training on how to deal with risks. Thus, providing workers access to HSE 
Inspectors’ reports and company risk assessments as part of a human rights account 
is in any case consistent with the duty of management to provide health and safety 
information to workers and a right of workers to receive it31.  The case of ICL 
demonstrates how in light of a legitimate authority to act in the public interest and 
uphold health and safety legislation the HSE and management are complicit in 
denying workers access to official ‘accounts’ of health and safety that could begin to 
                                                 
31
 The HSE acknowledges this when quoting under “ Releasing information to employees” – 
“Employers have a responsibility to provide information to all workers that will enable them to 
participate fully and effectively in any consultation about their health and safety.”  
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/workers/releasing.htm) 
 34 
provide them with the tools (or a basis to identify the tools) to manage health and 
safety risks.   
We have demonstrated State doxa that the State acts for the “good of the whole of 
society” is flawed, and yet, it still prevails.  For example, Lord Gill32 (Gill, 2009, p 94) 
clearly reflected this position when he stated that the “HSE represents the public 
interest.  It must assess its requirements by reference to safety criteria and to the 
tests of reasonableness and proportionality.  Its requirements must be uninfluenced 
by any commercial considerations that may affect the judgement of the owners of 
the site”. Yet evidence was revealed that the HSE in effect sanctioned ICL’s talks with 
Calor about Tyldesley’s recommendations. Calor’s economic capital was used by 
them to resist HSE recommendations thus demonstrating the unequal power 
relations in the case.  With this in mind, in terms of the process of production of HSE 
reports, potential suppliers and existing suppliers, such as Calor, or other third 
parties with a potential commercial interest should not be allowed to take part in 
negotiating “solutions”.   Thus, a condition of the account would be that no  
commercial supplier be involved in its production.   
 
While it would certainly be a step forward to provide HSE inspectors’ reports as part 
of a health and safety account we argue that the actual report itself would be 
enhanced by the creation of a more broadly based team comprising relevant worker 
representation.  Our research suggests that the workers at ICL certainly possess the 
requisite cultural capital to participate fully in the HSE inspection process.  However, 
on the economic field, non unionised workers possess little of the other forms of 
capital to enable them to win struggles on the field.  One way of addressing this 
would be to create a properly resourced Scottish Hazards Advice Centre which could 
provide representatives, and confidential advice to workers in both unionised and 
non-unionised organisations.  Thus, we recommend a Scottish Hazards Advice Centre 
be created. This centre should in consultation with workers and relevant trade 
unions write a workers’ response to the HSE Inspectors’ report and company risk 
assessment. The second element of the health and safety account would be a 
workers’ commentary prepared with the Scottish Hazards Advice Centre and Trade 
Union. 
 
The final section of the worker health and safety account should be financial. Even 
taking an economistic perspective on the value of health and safety and workers’ 
lives, ICL management would have had difficulty resisting spending £405 (or slightly 
more in the event of business interruption) on the buried pipe to make it safe.   As 
noted previously, in terms of representing and upholding the rights of workers to 
health and safety at work the unaudited, abbreviated accounts of the ICL Group of 
companies have proved to be inadequate. We recommend all money spent on 
health and safety by the company should be included in the health and safety 
account. Recognising the provision of expenditure alone can be misleading as low 
outlays can reflect either a system operating well and not in need of major 
                                                 
32
 Arguably, the Public Inquiry and Gill’s report serves to both legitimise the giving of HSE ‘accounts’ 
and arguably ‘consolidate the account’ of health and safety at ICL. As analysis of the Public Inquiry is 
beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed elsewhere. 
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improvement or a firm in which systems are poor but safety is not a priority we 
recommend explanatory information on the nature of expenditure undertaken and 
estimated costs of improvements be provided by management, workers, Hazards 
Advice Centre and Trade Union alongside recommendations and costings for 
remedying the issues raised in the HSE Inspectors’ report.  
 
Working within the current socio-economic system, we have set out a case that a 
new form of human and safety account should be produced by a balanced team 
comprising of the HSE, workers’ representatives, staff from a newly formed Scottish 
Hazard’s Advice Centre and/or Trade Union representative and a member of 
management.  This collaboration serves to legitimise the role of information 
provision by actors who may normally be seen to contributing to a social audit 
process and bring them into the accounting function. The resulting health and safety 
account should contain unabridged HSE Inspectors’ reports, the company risk 
assessment, a commentary by Scottish Hazards Advice Centre, workers and trade 
unions, together with a financial report containing both previous expenditure by the 
company on health and safety and costings of remedial work which have been 
highlighted in the HSE Inspectors’ report and workers’ response. A team approach to 
such collaboration will help to self-regulate the process of accounting and ensure 
transparency is achieved. The extent to which workers’ representatives, staff from a 
newly formed Scottish Hazard’s Advice Centre and/or Trade Union representative 
are empowered to police management is an issue requiring further research 
regarding their symbolic and structural significance.    
 
Unsafe factories which cannot afford recommendations of this newly combined 
group should be closed rather than risk the lives of workers and others.   
 
Conclusion 
 
When a worker goes to work each day, they should feel safe in the knowledge that 
they will return home safe and sound afterwards.  This is a basic human right.  While 
we can all see flaws in the economic and political system, on the whole we allow the 
government to govern and capitalists to make profits. In return, we expect our 
human rights to be protected and, to some extent, we expect the State to act in our 
interests.   
 
What we have found in the ICL case is that lip-service was paid to the protection of 
workers’ human rights.  The State claims to act in the interests of every citizen.  But 
close scrutiny of the systems and structures which purportedly protect us, in fact, do 
not.  And yet, we are told that they do; the belief that such structures exist for our 
benefit, is what makes us compliantly go along with the system.  This is what 
Bourdieu called “symbolic violence”.  An understanding of symbolic violence is one 
of the aspects of Bourdieu’s work which differentiates him from other social 
theorists.   
 
The nine deaths and 33 injuries which were caused by the ICL explosion were 
preventable.  The case study of the ICL disaster presented here unearths the 
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numerous points at which actions could have been taken to prevent the explosion.  
An HSE expert set out clear recommendations about the actions necessary to ensure 
the safety of the LPG installation at the ICL site in Glasgow.  The HSE did not take the 
legal steps which would have forced ICL management to implement these 
recommendations.  The State did not provide adequate resources for the HSE to 
carry out its work effectively.  The ICL management strongly resisted implementing 
the recommendations. The private LPG supplier aided ICL’s management in their 
negotiations with the HSE.  Rather than management engaging with employee 
management took a hostile and at time indifferent approach to workers. Each of 
these parties is arguably complicit in the disaster by failing to act to ensure the 
safety of ICL workers. 
 
Academic research has demonstrated that health and safety is improved when 
workers are involved in the management of health and safety.  The habitus of ICL 
appears opposed to this.  This made ICL a relatively more dangerous work 
environment.  Better knowledge would have enabled the workers to protect 
themselves. With such serious failures to ensure the safety of workers, one would 
imagine that the full-force of the law would be used against those complicit in the 
disaster.  Yet the punishment was very light.  Indeed ICL stand to profit financially 
from the disaster.   
 
Arguably, despite State policy and rhetoric to the contrary little appears to have 
changed with regard to state symbolic violence since workplace regulation began in 
Victorian Britain.  This is in part because of the misrecognition of violence, including 
that proliferated by the new HSE. Viewing workers’ human rights to health and 
safety through the lens provided by Bourdieu allows us to radically begin to rethink 
the historical methodisation of accounting for human rights. Our views are offered 
as a starting point for debate both in terms of engagement on Bourdieu’s account of 
symbolic violence and its use in examining human rights and the ICL disaster. We 
recognise that our suggestions for change will not prevent those at the top of the 
economic field buying the best lawyers nor from moving to States with less stringent 
laws. In effect we are proposing a very slight levelling of the economic   field as a 
starting point for theoretical debate and action.  
 
Our recommendations for action begin with public access to a health and safety 
account containing unabridged HSE Inspectors’ reports. In so doing, we question 
whether we are simply proliferating the system by arguing for worker access to the 
HSE Inspectors’ reports. Recognising and making transparent the HSE ‘accounts’ are 
just the beginning of a quest for social change.  We also recommend the health and 
safety account contain the company’s risk assessment, a commentary by a Scottish 
Hazards Advice Centre, workers and trade unions, together with a financial report 
containing both previous expenditure and explanatory note by the company on 
health and safety and costing of remedial work which have been highlighted in the 
HSE Inspectors’ report and workers’ response. We realise that our recommendations 
for such a health and safety account is only, at best, a partial solution. Our 
recommendations will not alter the power structures in society and are thus 
reformist.  However, given the state we are in, we need to fight for reforms. 
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